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COMM11EN1TS

isolated group chargeable with liability has an element of unfairness about it.
If liability is to be imposed at all, would it not be more equitable to make
each stockholder bear his pro rata share of the liability?
In his Memorandum of Approval53 on the Business Corporation Law, Governor Rockefeller lauded the changes made therein, but concluded:
While opinions may differ as to the visdom of particular changes made by the bill,
its delayed effective date -will permit enactment at the next two regular sE. sions of
the Legislature of any amendments
which are cosidered necessary or desirable
4
before the new law takes effect.Z
It is suggested that further study is required and that amendment, perhaps
even repeal, might well be one of the actions "which are considered nece~sary
or desirable before the new law takes effect".5

THE INTEGRATED BAR ASSOCIATION
Advocates of bar integration found some measure of encouragement,
however small, when, on June 19, 1961, the United States Supreme Court,
in Lathrop v. Donohue,' upheld the constitutionality of the compulsory state
bar association as established in the State of Wisconsin.
An integrated bar is defined as an official state organization requiring membership and financial support of all attorneys admitted to practice in that
jurisdiction.2 It has two facets which set it apart from a voluntary bar
association-official organization by authority of the state and compulsory
membership.
The purpose of an integrated bar is substantially the same as that of
voluntary associations. A generally representative summary is found in the
Wisconsin State Bar which aims
to aid the courts in carring on and improving the administration of justice; to foster
and maintain on the part of those engaged in the practice of law high ideals of integrity, learning, competence and public service and high standards of conduct; to
safeguard the proper professional interests of the members of the bar; to encourage
the formation and activities of local bar associations; to provide a forum for the
53. Governor's Memorandum of Approval, in N.Y. Bus, Corp. Law p. 1 (McKinnzy's

1961).
54. Id. at 3.
55. Ibid.
1. 367 US. 820 (1961), affirming 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (19C0). Trayton L.
Lathrop, a Wsconsin lawyer sued Joseph Donohue, treasurer of the Wisconsin Bar Asociation, to recover his $15 dues on the ground that the integrated bar of Wiscencin vas
unconstitutional as infringing on his rights of freedom of as-ociation and spzcch. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the integrated bar did not violate the United States

Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed with Justices Black and
Douglas dissenting. See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
2. In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 So. 2d 398 (1942); Ayres v. Hadaway, 303 Midi. SS9,
6 N.W.2d 905 (1942); In re Gibson, 35 N.M. 550, 4 P.2d 643 (1931).
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discussion of subjects pertaining to the practice of law, the science of jurisprudence
and law reform, and the relations of the bar to the public, and to publish informa-

tion relating thereto; to the end that3 the public responsibilities of the legal profession
may be more effectively discharged.
The integrated bar movement is not a recent innovation. On the contrary,
it has had its advocates in this country since 19144 and has existed in various

parts of the United Kingdom for many years., In 1921, a few years after
a model bar act was published by the American Judicature Society, o North
Dakota became the first jurisdiction to establish an integrated bar.7 To date
there are twenty-seven states and two federal jurisdictions, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands, which have followed suit.8
3. Wis. Stat. Ann. ch. 256 app., rule 1, § 2 (1957), quoted with approval in Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. at 826.
4. Harley, A Lawyer's Trust, 29 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 50 (1945). Impressed by the effectiveness of the Canadian Bar, Herbert Harley, the founder of the American Judicature
Society, initiated the movement in this country with his Address Before Lancaster County,
Neb. Bar Ass'n, Dec. 28, 1914.
5. See Winters, Integration of the Bar-You Can't Lose, 39 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 140, 141
(1956).
6. 4 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 111-24 (1920).
7. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 27-11-01 to -27 (1960).
8. Table of Integrated Jurisdictions:
(A) Statutory Integration:
Alabama: Ala. Code tit. 46, §§ 21-26 (1958).
Alaska: Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 35-2-77a to -77o (Supp. 1958).
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 32-201 to -275 (1956).
California: Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6000-154.
Idaho: Idaho Code Ann. §§ 3-101 to -420 (1948).
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. §§ 8685-724 (1956).
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 7.270-.600 (1960).
New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-1-1 to -36 (1953).
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 84-15 to -38 (1958).
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code §§ 27-11-01 to -27 (1960).
Oregon: Ore. Code Ann. §§ 28-101 to -111 (1930).
Puerto Rico: P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 4, §§ 771-85 (1954).
South Dakota: S.D. Code §§ 32.1101-.1124 (1939).
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 to -44 (1953).
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2.48.010-.230 (1961).
(B) Court Rule:
Florida: Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
Missouri: Leimer v. Hulse, 352 Mo. 451, 178 S.W.2d 335, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 744
(1944).
Nebraska: In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265
(1937).

Oklahoma: In re Integration of State Bar, 185 Okla. 505, 95 P.2d 113 (1939).
Virgin Islands: 2 V.I. Code Ann. it. 5, Judicial Procedure app., pt. III, rule 51 (1957).
(C) Combination of Statute and Court Rule
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30.010-.990 (1955) (§ 30.170-court rules to govern
State Bar); Commonwealth v. Defever, 241 Ky. 834, 45 S.W.2d 489 (1932).
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Bar integration has been accomplished in three principal ways. The most
common is by a detailed act of the legislature in the exercise of its police
powers; the second is by rule of court based on the court's inherent poroer to
regulate and control the practice of law; and the third is by a combination of
legislative act and court rule, the legislature first creating the organization and
the court acting pursuant to an enabling statute to develop the particulars of
its structure and of its government by court promulgated rules.
The validity of an integrated bar created by statute has been sustained
in several state court decisions. And it has also been held that there is no
delegation of a legislative function when the integration is accomplished by
rule of court.10 Since integration is an incident to the exercise of the judicial
power vested in the courts, it has been said that it is not a legislative function,
and an enabling statute is not a prerequisite to its exercise.' Thus when
the Oklahoma legislature repealed its state bar act in 1939, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma asserted its inherent power to integrate the bar without
reliance upon statutory authority.'- Several other jurisdictions also have adopted

integration purely by rule of court. 13 In those jurisdictions the integrated

Louisiana: La Rev. Stat. §§ 37:211-:218 (1950); 195 La. xiv-xlvii (1940).
Michigan: Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 691.51-.52 (1943) ; 273 Mich.xxv-x.lv (1935).
Texas: Ter. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 320a-1 (1959).
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 54-49 (1950); 171 Va. xvii-lvii (1933).
West Virginia: W. Va. Code Ann. § 5133 (1) (1961) ; 123 W. Va. liii-Lbii (1947).
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. § 256.31 (1957); In re Integrated Bar, 273 Wis. 231, 77 N.W.
2d 602 (1956).
Wyoming: Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5-22 (1957); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. Sup. Ct.
Rules for State Bar, rule 5 (1957).
(D) Constitutional Amendment
Arkansas: Ark. Cost. amend. xviiL
9. Rinds v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 2d 37, 119 P.2d 134 (1941); Hill v. State Bar, 14 Cal
2d 732, 97 P.2d 236 (1939), sustaining the statute as a regulatory measure under the police
power; Ayres v. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 589, 6 N.W.2d 905 (1942), holding that such Etatute3
do not violate the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
10. Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 3, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943).
11. In re Sparks, 267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W.2d 194 (1937). The court stated that "the
power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not dcplnd upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a
court-appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice. That
we have in deference to the Bar Integration Act . . . sct up a standing Board of Commissioners and machinery to conduct and report on investigations concerning the conduct
of attorneys, does not alter the fact that we are but exerting an inherent power . . . ." Id.
at 95, 101 S.W.2d at 196. In In re Day, 131 IMi.73, 54 N.E. 646 (1399), the court vent
further and stated that any act of the legislature purporting to grant to the judiciary
the power to regulate the bar, is itself a usurpation of judicial power by the leJ-iature.
12. In re Integration of State Bar, 135 Okla. 505, 95 P.2d 113 (1939). A new statute
to the same effect was enacted shortly thereafter. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §13 (1941).
13. Florida, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and the Virgin Islands. See note 23 infra
and accompanying text.
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bar was characterized as "an agency of the court"' 14 to provide for the
discipline of all attorneys admitted to practice and for the levy and collection
of annual dues for the privilege of practicing law.
FUTURE OF INTEGRATION IN NEw YORK

By reason of its peculiar constitutional history and court structure it
is doubtful whether in New York integration could be accomplished by
rule of court. New York is one of several states which have patterned their judicial systems on that of Great Britain. The New York State constitution of 1777
specifically continued in existence the then existing courts, 1 of which the
supreme court was paramount.10 After 1777, appeals from the supreme court
were treated in much the same way as they were in colonial times, 17 the
state's highest tribunal being composed almost entirely of nonjudicial
members, who convened irregularly. From the outset, the power to discipline
attorneys was vested in the supreme court and remained there through
every subsequent statutory and constitutional revision.' 8 Section 88 of the
Judiciary Law, 19 amended in 191220 to read substantially as it does today,
gives the supreme court express power and control over attorneys and
2
counselors at law. '

Traditionally then, it is clear that the granted or asserted general control
and disciplinary powers which the highest tribunals of other states have,
are not within the domain of the Court of Appeals of New York. Its primary
function is to hear and pass on questions of law2 2 The four states 23 in
14.

In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 43, 11 So. 2d 398, 400 (1942).

15. N.Y. Const. art. XXVII (1777).
16. Two years prior to the Declaration of Independence, Governor Tryon, New York's
ablest executive during the colonial period, summed up the judicial structure in Ncw York In
his report to the home country: "Of the Courts of Common Law the Chief is called the
Supreme Court-The Judges of which have all the Powers of the King's Bench, Common
Pleas & Exchequer in England." 1 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York
39 (1906).
17. 1 Lincoln, op. cit. supra note 16, at 39-40. In the colonial period the supreme

court was the highest tribunal with appeals going to the Royal Governor and his Council
only in certain instances. An appeal from there to the Privy Council was only allowed
where the amount in controversy exceeded f500 sterling.
18. See People v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 477, 162 N.E. 487, 492 (1928), where Judge
Cardozo traced the history and development of this power.
19. N.Y. judiciary Law § 88 (now N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90).
20. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1912, ch. 253.
21. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(2). See also N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90, which enumerates
as being delegated or confirmed in the supreme court the majority of powers claimed to be
inherent in the highest courts of other states.
22. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7. The facts are reviewable only in capital cases; the court
may also review where the appellate division, reviewing a trial held without a jury, finds
new facts and reverses the trial court.
23. Florida, Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949); Nebraska,
In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265 (1937); Okla-
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which integration was adopted by rule of court had the following in common:
(1) governments established long after the colonial era; (2) pyramidal
legal systems modeled after that of the federal government; (3) constitutions
expressly granting broad judicial powers; 2-1 (4) original jurisdiction vested,
in many instances, in their highest courts; (5) rule making power claimed by
inherent right; and, (6) a tradition of judicial supremacy in the fields of
admission and discipline.5
It is safe to say that if there is to be an integrated bar in New Yorl:,
it may be accomplished only by act of the legislature.
ARGU=AINTS IN FAVOR OF INTEGIrATION

Effective DisciplinaryProgram
The argument most often urged in favor of the integrated bar is that
integration provides the most effective method of policing and disciplining
the legal profession. All-inclusive membership, in addition to official status,
makes it possible to clothe the bar with the power of self-government. As
a result, all lawyers admitted to practice within the jurisdiction are required
to conform to uniform standards of conduct. The advocates of integration
in New York cite this as affording a remedy for the often conflicting rules
of the four departments of the appellate division. It is argued in rebuttal
that lawyers who fail to abide by the accepted standards of practice are
subject to disbarment under the system now existing, and higher standards
can easily be imposed through more difficult and searching bar examinations
as well as by raising the requirements relating to scholastic achievement. It
is a plausible proposition. The basic problem however, is that the standards
of practice are not dearly defined. There is an ever present need to raise
moral, ethical, and general qualifications both for admission to the bar and for
the continuing practice of law. And the further objection has been made
that since this determination would rest in a committee's discretion we
would have a system essentially "undemocratic." It would seem that the
policing of professional ranks by the members themselves represents a traditional form of self-government. But, even aside from that fact, is this any
different than the present New York system which puts the character committees into the various voluntary bar associations, particularly in view of
the fact that as bar integration has proceeded in other states the ultimate
authority for disciplinary action has been placed in the highest court of
each state?
homa, In re Integration of State Bar, 185 OQda. 505, 95 P.2d 113 (1939); Mizzouri, Le.imer
v. Hulse, 352 Mo. 451, 178 S.W.2d 335 (1944). See also Virgin lands, 2 VI. Code Ann.
tit. 5, Judicial Procedure app. pt. III, rule 51 (1957).
24. Fia. Const. art. V, § 1; 16o. Const. art. V, §§ 1-2; Neb. Cort. art. V, §§ 1-2;
Okia. Coust. art. VII, § 1.

25. State v. City of Avon Park, 117 Fla. 565, 153 So. 159 (1934); Rem v. State, S9
Fla. 113, 103 So. 399 (1925); In re Sparrow, 33S Mlo. 203, 90 S.AVd 401 (1935); In re
Richards, 333 MIo. 907, 63 S.W.2d 672 (1933); In re Sizer, 3C0 Mo. 369, 254 S.V. S2 (1923);
State v. Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 153 S.W. 671 (1913); State v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4
N.W.2d 302 (1942); State v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 263 N.W. 95 (1936).
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A Unified Voice
Integration gives the bar increased prominence in the community by providing a unified voice,26 so that greater force is given to the opinions of the
bar on matters of interest to lawyers. This is significant in New York where
the numerous voluntary bar associations have created a fragmentation of
the bar.27 It is argued, however, that this unity would be a false one,
imposed upon minority groups espousing divergent views on questions of bar
discipline, standards, ethics, and unauthorized practice. Furthermore, chief
among the bar's functions is lobbying for measures deemed necessary and
advantageous for good government and the proper administration of justice.
The question naturally arises as to the propriety of compelling an individual
to join and support2 8an organization which campaigns for measures to which
he may be opposed.
A1RGUIZENTS AGAINST INTEGRATION

Membership Fee as a Tax
One of the main objections to integration by court rule has been that
membership fees would be a tax which the courts are not empowered to levy.
Several cases have found this objection, as well as the related protest that
the involuntary assessment constituted a deprivation of property without
due process of law, to be without merit.2
In Lathrop v. Donohue,30 the United States Supreme Court did not come
to grips with these constitutional questions. The petitioner contended that
both the action of the state supreme court integrating the Wisconsin bar,
coupled with that bar's campaigns for legal reforms, were violative of due
process and equal protection as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
The Court could find no violation of the first amendment's guarantee of
freedom of association but, because adequate facts did not appear in the
record, it did not pass upon the alleged violation of freedom of speech or
upon any of the other constitutional issues.31 In view of the increased interest
26. Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949). The court outlined
the progress made by the California integrated bar, indicating the effectiveness of the greater
resources of a unified bar. It publishes a journal with a mailing list of 16,000, giving In
detail the accomplishments of the integrated bar. It has a membership of 15,000 and a
budget of $250,000 annually. Id. at 905.
27. See Porter, The Bar: Fragmented All Apart, 18 B. Bull. 50 (N.Y. County Lawyers'
Ass'n 1960).
28. See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
29. In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 So. 2d 398 (1942); Ayes v. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 589,
6 N.W.2d 905 (1942); Petition for Integration of the Bar, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N.W.2d SIS
(1943).
30. 367 U.S. 820 (1961). See 45 3. Am. Jud. Soc'y 49 (Aug., 1961); 34 Wis. B. Bull. 43
(Oct. 1961).

31. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court was joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Clark and Stewart. This segment of the Court relied, to a large extent, upon Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), which held that the reasonable expectation of the union shop, being a stabilizing force in interstate commerce, justified
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in the integrated bar it appears doubtful that the Court will be able to avoid
indefinitely the constitutional issues raised by Lathrop. Until such a time
the state courts will be faced with the "disquieting constitutional uncer-

tainty"3 2 created by the plurality.

Political Encroachment
Those who disagree with the usefulness of bar integration have questioned
the independence of such an organization from political parties, especially
in a state such as New York, where control of judicial patronage plays a
major role in the functioning of the county organizationsPa There is evidence
of some presently existing political control of a few bar associations and the
fear has therefore been raised that these occasional attempts by political
factions to dominate individual voluntary bar groups might turn into a fierce
struggle for control of a monolithic integrated bar if such bar had a great
voice in the selection of judges.34
Unnecessary Where Voluntary Bars Arc Active
The advantages claimed for the integrated bar are the same that an
efficiently operating bar association offers.3 5 The advocates of bar integration
stress the fact that no state that has integrated has ever returned to its old
system.'- On the other hand, no state with an efficiently operated voluntary
bar of which a high percentage of actively practicing attorneys were members,
has found it necessary to integrate. Only states with inadequate voluntary
bar associations have integrated. Hence, in Kansas, Illinois, and Iowa, where
83%, 78-85%, and 93% respectively, of the active lawyers in the state belong
governmental action designed to foster union membership. Thus it was reasoncd that the
requirement that lawyers practicing in the state become mcmbers of the integratcd bar and
pay reasonable annual dues did not violate the first amendment's guarantee of freedcm of
association as made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Juztice
Harlan, with whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined, concurred in the judgmcnt. Thcir view
was that constitutional rights had not been impinged upon, and that the firt amendment
question should not be left in doubt. Mr. Justice Whittaker concurred in a Erparate and
tersely stated opinion in which he declared flatly that the requirement of a $15 annual fe
did not violate any constitutional provision. Mr. Justice Black, in his disznt , cundudcd
that there could be "few plainer, more direct abridgments of the frecdoms of the First
Amendment than to compel persons to support candidates, partic., ideologie or cau:
that they are against." 367 U.S. at 873. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his diwcnt, loecd upcn
the Hanson case "as a narrow exception to be closely confined . . . . [lezt] we practically
give carte blanche to any legislature to put at least professional people into gc2.--qtcpping
brigades." Id. at S84.
32. Id. at S48 (Black, J., dissenting).
33. Sayre v Kaufman, Governing New York City 53S-43 (1960).
34. Id. at 551.
35. Edmonds, Integration of the Bar: A Boon or A Bust?, 32 NY.S1B. Bull. 297, 303
(1960).
36. The Oklahoma legislature did repeal its integration statute in 1939, after sEven
years of operation, but a new and similar statute was enacted vithin a few years. See ncte
12 supra and accompanying text.

